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A REFLECTION ON RULEMAKING:
THE RULE 11 EXPERIENCE
Paul D. Carrington* and Andrew Wasson"
The experience with Rule 11 is a useful reminder of what we
know but often forget about the effectiveness of law. It offers
disproof of the nihilist view of legal texts sometimes voiced in the
past by extreme legal realists or their successors among the Crits,'
and also of the contrary belief sometimes voiced by Originalists and
their positivist kin that the conduct of judges can be, should be, or
generally is controlled by the commands of lawgivers, whoever they
might be.2
The lawgivers who made Rule 11 were numerous. At all levels,
they worked from a premise associated with the eighteenth century
Enlightenment that the aim of civil adjudication is to apply the
command of substantive lawgivers who make constitutions, statutes,
and administrative rules to real events as best they can be perceived.
That is a very tall order, and procedure rules are therefore written in
elastic terms crafted to leave the judges in any particular case free to
do substantive justice unimpeded by unnecessary ceremonies; that
add to the inevitable costs and delays of dispute resolution and
distracts parties and judges from the correct goal.4 Writing such
rules is also a very tall, perhaps even a taller, order. Parties to
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1. See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
2. See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminary and Institutional Design, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 875, 899 (2003).
3. See Paul D. Carrington, Recent Efforts to Change Discovery Rules:
Advice for Draftsmen of Rules for State Courts, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 456,
456-57 (2000).
4. See FED. R. C1V. P. 1; Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward
Discretion, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev., 1561 (2003).
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disputes and their lawyers often do not want the law correctly
applied to the true facts. In an enlightened world, therefore, it is
necessary to have procedures that prevent cost, delay, subterfuge,
and other depravities. But procedures designed to serve that benign
purpose have a way of becoming themselves the instruments of cost,
delay, subterfuge, and other depravities, as Rule 11 seemed to many
to have done. Alas, pity the poor procedural lawgivers whose work
is forever the object of subversion by crafty professionals.
The 1983 version of Rule 11 was designed to address a
perceived social problem-that there were too many civil
proceedings and too much motion practice in federal courts and that
this costly excess was the result of neglect, indifference, or misuse of
procedure by counsel.6  Whether there was or is in fact such a
problem remains uncertain.7 There had been an increase in civil
filings in the decade of the 1970s, but much of it was explained by
changes in substantive law, notably in the field of civil rights. A
measurable increase in filings of contract disputes seemingly
reflected an apparent tendency of businesses to take their disputes to
court more frequently than they had in the past. This might be
plausibly explained by the entrenchment in the third quarter of the
twentieth century of the practice of business litigators to bill for their
services by the hour, for this created a strong incentive to leave no
stone unturned and no motion unmade.
8
5. See William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisted, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013,
1017-18 (1998).
6. See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule ll-
Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and
Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1316 (1986).
7. See Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or the Federal
Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIs. L. REv. 921 (1988) [hereinafter
The Life and Times]; Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased
Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 77, 83-90 (1993); Marc
Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv. 1093,
1109-12 (1996); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1147 (1992). There is no doubt that there was a growing burden of asbestos
cases, but that was not evident until about 1990. The senior author, Paul
Carrington, will review the data in: Premature Adjudication: Lessons from the
Asbestos Crisis (forthcoming).
8. See generally WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF
TIME-BASED BILLING BY ATTORNEYS (1996).
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In addition to these realities, Corporate America perceived that it
was being besieged by tort claims.9 Very little evidence existed to
verify this assertion, but the perception would lead to a series of
reform initiatives, including the first President Bush's
Competitiveness Council,' 0 Senator Biden's Civil Justice Reform
Act," the Private Litigation Reform Act, 12 and numerous proposals
still pending.
13
Thus, whatever the realities or their causes, 1980 witnessed a
perception growing in the minds of some federal judges and some
corporate executives and their lawyers, of a problem in need of a
solution that arose from the liberality and tolerance embedded in the
1938 Federal Rules. 14 Existing state law allowing suits for abuse of
process and federal law seeking to deter vexatious litigation were
widely deemed inadequate to discourage abuse of a system so
flexible. 
15
The 1983 version was a response to those concerns. The
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the
United States (Advisory Committee) crafted the rule. 16 The Standing
Committee on Rules approved the Advisory Committee's
recommendation and forwarded it to the Judicial Conference, which
9. See The Life and Times, supra note 7.
10. The Council was established by Presidential decree on March 31,1989,
and headed by Vice President Quayle. The apex of its efforts at tort reform
may have been the Vice President's address to the American Bar Association
on August 13, 1991. For his account of his presentation, see DAN QUAYLE,
STANDING FIRM: A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL MEMOIR 282-90 (1994).
11. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. For an insightful
account of the origins of that legislation, see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in
Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the
Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994).
12. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000)).
13. For an apt account of the movement for procedural "reform," see Arthur
R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion, "
"Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury
Trial Commitments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003).
14. See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 589, 592-93 (1998).
15. See THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS, 19-
22 (1988).
16. See 131 F.R.D. 335,338-41 (1990).
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approved the rule and recommended it to the Supreme Court. 17 The
Court promulgated the new rule in accordance with the Rules
Enabling Act,18 and Congress retained power to derail it by action
taken within six months. Congress did not derail it, and so it became
law on May 1, 1983. Throughout this lengthy process, the bar
expressed limited interest.
It appears that the revised rule did have the effect of causing
some lawyers to do a bit more preparatory work before filing a claim
or motion in federal court. 19 While many lawyers told the American
Judicature Society that they had counseled a client not to file suit in
light of Rule 11, the impact on actual filings was not evident. The
real effect of Rule 11 in that respect remains unknown. And how
much additional cost to prospective defendants or to the judicial
system was saved or borne because those cases were not filed or
those motions not made is even more a mystery. In any case, the
1983 revision gave rise to a chorus of complaints.20 Among these
complaints were that the new rule: (1) gave rise to a new industry of
Rule 11 motion practice adding to cost and delay; (2) stimulated
incivility between lawyers; (3) was aimed at plaintiffs counsel,
leaving defense counsel unrestrained in the assertion of unfounded
denials; and, (4) encouraged judges to indulge their occasional
personal animus toward individual lawyers, sometimes by belated
sua sponte rulings coming after a dispute that seemed to have been
resolved.2'
The chorus steadily raised its voice. Rule 11 became a
celebrated issue. That is something a good procedure rule should not
become. Three excellent books by distinguished authors sought to
17. See id.
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (2003).
19. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE
REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 11, 68-72 (Stephen R. Burbank ed., 1989) [hereinafter AMERICAN
JUDICATURE SOCIETY]; REPORT ON RULE 11 (E. Wiggins et al. eds., 1989)
N.Y. State Bar Comm. on Fed. Courts, Sanctions and Attorneys' Fees (1987);
WILLGING, supra note 15.
20. For an example, see Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the
Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IOwA L. REV 1775, 1775 (1992) (referring to
the 1983 revision as "the most controversial revision of the Federal Rules in
their fifty-five year history").
21. See Georgine M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where Are We and Where Are We
Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (1991).
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state or restate the law of Rule 11.22 In addition, scores of law
review articles were written. No other single procedure rule in the
nation's history was ever given so much critical attention.
Investigators gathered an extraordinary quantity of empirical
data to illuminate the use to which lawyers put the rule, but of
course, the investigators could not detect---other than
impressionistically- whether there were filings or motions deterred,
or whether there were real net cost savings to the courts or parties.
23
The studies, excellent though they were, tended to illustrate a point
made by Maurice Rosenberg, himself an empiricist and long a
member of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, who
frequently affirmed that there are two kinds of empiricism in law: the
sort causing lawyers to sniff that the obvious had been revealed, and
the other causing lawyers indignantly to reject the conclusions as
contrary to their experience.2 4 One of the better studies suggested
that the rule was working as intended to deter frivolous claims and
motions, and that in the opinion of many lawyers posed no serious
problems, 25 but one could not doubt that many lawyers were angered
by the operation of the rule.
The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, together with the
committee, sent out a call for comments on the rule.26 A flood of
comments were received, almost surely the largest supply of
criticisms and suggestions in the fifty-odd years of the Committee's
existence. The Committee deliberated for two years and came up
with the compromise solution of the safe harbor. A draft was
circulated, and more comments were received. Hearings were held.
Revisions were made in response to the comments. A draft was
recommended to the Standing Committee. The Standing Committee
22. GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION
ABUSE (1989); JEROLD S. SOLOVY & CHARLES M. SHAFFER, JR., RULE 11 AND
OTHER SANCTIONS: NEW ISSUES IN FEDERAL LITIGATION (1987); GEORGENE
M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTIVE
MEASURES (2d ed. 1995).
23. See AMERiCAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 19 at 95-96.
24. See Paul D. Carrington, Maurice Rosenberg, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1901,
1903 (1995).
25. See AMERiCAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 19 at 75-76.
26. 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990).
27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 l(c)(1)(A) (providing that a party has twenty-one
days from service of a motion for sanctions to correct the violation before the
opposing party files the motion with the court.).
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debated the draft at length and made further revisions. The Advisory
Committee notes enumerated the reasons for yet another revision:
(1) Rule 11, in conjunction with other rules, has tended to
impact plaintiffs more frequently and severely than
defendants; (2) it occasionally has created problems for a
party which seeks to assert novel legal contentions or which
needs discovery from other persons to determine if the
party's belief about the facts can be supported with
evidence; (3) it has too rarely been enforced through
nonmonetary sanctions, with cost-shifting having become
the normative sanction; (4) it provides little incentive, and
perhaps a disincentive, for a party to abandon positions
after determining they are no longer supportable in fact or
law; and (5) it sometimes has produced unfortunate
conflicts between attorney and client, and exacerbated
contentious behavior between counsel.28
The Standing Committee's revision was approved by the
Judicial Conference and, in due course, promulgated by the Supreme
Court, but not without a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia.2 9 The
revision became law on December 1, 1993.30
Meanwhile, however, as these deliberations were nearing
completion, the Supreme Court decided Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.,
31
In that case, the Court held that a district court has inherent power-
in the absence of authorizing texts-to punish lawyers and their
clients for persisting in the presentation of a frivolous, indeed
fraudulent, defense.32 It was observed that the conduct punished in
that case included much that was not reached by Rule 11 because it
was not reflected in pleadings or motions; nor was it entirely within
28. Attachment B to Letter from Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Jr. to Hon. Robert E.
Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rights 2-5 (May 1, 1992), reprinted
in 146 F.R.D. 519, 523 (1993). For an exhaustive review of all changes and
predicted ramifications, see also Georgene M. Vairo, The New Rule 11: Past as
Prologue?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39 (1994).
29. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, reprinted in, 146 F.R.D. 507,
509 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
31. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
32. See id. at 49.
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reach of the contempt power.33 The Court concluded that neither
Rule 11 nor the statute forbidding lawyers to engage in vexatious
behavior was applicable to much of the misconduct, but that this
should not preclude a court from doing whatever it takes to prevent
abuse.34 The Court urged judges to use Rule 11 when applicable, but
not to be constrained by it in necessitous circumstances.35 In so
holding, the Court relied in part on its earlier decision 36 upholding
the power of the district court to dismiss a claim for failure to
prosecute even though the defendant had made no motion to dismiss,
notwithstanding the explicit language of FRCP Rule 41(b), requiring
such a motion as a precondition to dismissal.37
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee laboring over the final
draft of Rule 11 as the opinion in Chambers came down, was moved
to ponder the question whether such rules are worth writing. If
district courts are always free to do the right thing, why fuss over the
text of mere procedural rules that will themselves be the subject of
further disputation? It seemed for the moment that perhaps the legal
nihilists had it right, that life tenured judges may and will do what
they want unconstrained by mere words in legal texts.
38
But the experience with Rule 11 does provide an answer to the
unsettling question suggested by Chambers. The text of the 1983
version of the rule did serve to modify the behavior of judges in
ways at least some of which were those intended by the lawgivers-
and so did the 1993 version.
Professor Danielle Hart recently published an informative
account of that experience. 39 She calls attention to several conflicts
in the interpretation of the rule by United States Courts of Appeals.
It seems that the courts of appeals are not in agreement on the
urgency of the requirements stated in the rule-that a motion for
33. See id. at 41-43.
34. See id. at 49-51.
35. See id. at 44.
36. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
37. See id. at 630-31.
38. E.g., Singer, supra note 1.
39. Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its Impact on Federal Civil Rights
Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REv. 1 (2002).
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sanctions must be made separately,40 and the need for strict
enforcement of the twenty-one-day safe harbor provision.4'
Additionally, disagreement exists as to the strict enforcement of the
42timing requirement applicable to motions under the rule. Some
courts have been more tolerant than others regarding compliance
with the rule's provisions regarding the form of a court's Rule 11
order.43 Finally, the courts of appeals have not applied the same
standard in their reviews of sanctions orders, but have redefined
"abuse of discretion" differently. 44 In these matters and others,
Professor Hart found numerous intracircuit conflicts.45
These are, no doubt, imperfections in the text and in the
administration of the rule." They are, however, the kinds of
imperfections we must expect in an enlightened system of judicial
administration seeking to decide cases on the merits without
unnecessary cost or delay and in accordance with a text intended to
provide a structure to the process of dispute resolution without
distracting the parties and the judge from the merits.
A specific concern regarding the 1983 version of the rule was
that it was unevenly enforced with the substantive consequence that
civil rights plaintiffs were disadvantaged.47 There was some
evidence that civil rights plaintiffs were somewhat more frequently
the target of Rule 11 motions, and other evidence that when targeted,
they were more likely to be sanctioned.48 On the other hand, an
explanation was tendered that the class of employment
discrimination plaintiffs contain a higher than normal concentration
of desperate or irrational claimants, reflecting perhaps the fact that
the number of plaintiffs proceeding pro se is larger in that group than
40. See, e.g., Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 294 n.7 (6th Cir.
1997).
41. See, e.g., Zuk v. E. Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. Coll. of Pa., 103
F.3d 294, 298 n.3 (3d Cir. 1996).
42. See Hart, supra note 39, at 60-62.
43. See, e.g., Nuwesra v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 174 F.3d 87,
92 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999).
44. See Hart, supra note 39, at 78-81.
45. Id. at 61-62.
46. Imperfection is, after all, the normal state of the law. See NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIvES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
47. See Nelken, supra note 6 at 1327.
48. See id.
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most, and that their lawyers are often poorly informed because they
have such limited early access to the evidence as it will appear at
trial. It was also obvious that many lawyers representing civil rights
plaintiffs are low on resources, and therefore more vulnerable to, and
more intimidated by, the threat of sanctions.
To the extent that this uneven effect was a consequence of the
1983 rule, the modifications in 1993 that were intended to alleviate
the problem included both the safe harbor provision protecting
counsel from sanctions if the sanctionable filing is timely withdrawn
after its defects have been pointed out by the adversary, and the
preference for non-monetary sanctions. These protections did not
completely protect the non-compliant party or counsel if the judge
undertook to impose a sanction sua sponte.49 It is not possible on the
present state of our knowledge to say whether the problem for civil
rights plaintiffs as perceived under the 1983 rule abides under the
1993 version.50 Professor Hart perceives that the 1993 modifications
are an insufficient remedy, and thus civil rights claims continue to be
deterred. 51 As noted, they may be the category of civil cases most
likely to be affected by any rule intended to deter the filing of
unwarranted claims.
At the end of the day, there is no way to eliminate the possibility
of uneven enforcement by a mere legal text, especially one written as
a procedure rule that must, in the spirit of Rule 1, leave room for
judges to do the right thing in light of the law and the facts as they
are best able to perceive them. Necessarily, room to do the right
thing must by definition allow some room for a judge to do the
wrong thing. If Rule 11 were stricken altogether, the problem that
some litigants appear to be treated differently from some others with
respect to their procedural entitlements would be magnified. As
Chambers v. NASCO Inc. affirmed, power and discretion would
continue to reside in the judge and on a much larger scale.5 2 But the
discretion to impose sanctions on lawyers would even then not be
unfettered, nor would there be an absence of legitimacy to the
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(2)(B).
50. For thoughtful consideration of the issue, see Mark Spiegel, The Rule
11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into the Neutrality of
Procedural Rules, 32 CONN. L. REv. 155 (1999).
51. See Hart, supra note 39, at 117.
52. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,45-46 (1991).
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decisions so long as they were within a compass crudely fashioned
from the reactions of appellate judges.53
As the Court in Chambers acknowledged, discretion to do the
54wrong thing can be cabined by an appropriate text. This is so
because most judges, most of the time, do not. wish to present
themselves as omnipotent, but seek the moral shelter afforded by
their adherence to the commands of lawgivers. It is that impulse that
gave rise to the institutionalization of the opinion of the court. In its
1938 form, Rule 11 afforded no such shelter for judges inclined to
deter abuse. In its 1983 form, perhaps it afforded too much.
Possibly, at least for this time and place, the 1993 version has it
about right.
53. For an exceptionally thoughtful reflection on the consequences of
loosely crafted law, see Dorf, supra note 2.
54. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47.
